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Abstract
In all common models of inter-temporal allocation, the assumption of a constant elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (EIS) imposes surprising limitations on within period budget allo-
cations. Consequently, the constant EIS assumption can be tested with demand data. In fact,
the EIS is pinned down completely by the shape of Engel curves: if the EIS is constant then
the EIS can be estimated without variation in the interest rate. That a price elasticity can be
estimated without variation in the relevant price illustrates just how strong the constant EIS
assumption is. The constant EIS assumption is rejected by demand data.
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11 Introduction
Optimizing models of the intertemporal allocation of consumption are the work-horses of modern
macroeconomics and public ￿nance. Almost always, such models assume the power (or isolelastic)
form for within period utility (the ‘felicity function’). One reason is that, in combination with
additivity over time, this gives homothetic (intertemporal) preferences and this homotheticity is of
considerable analytic convenience. For example, in a standard growth model, for a feasible steady
state to be optimal, both consumption and marginal utility must grow at a constant rate and this
requires intertemporal homotheticity.
Power felicity functions imply the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is constant: rich
and poor agents are equally averse to proportional ￿uctuations in consumption. This is not an in-
nocuous assumption. For example, as Chari and Kehoe (2007) point out, the well-known prescription
of a zero tax on capital income follows from the fact that quantitative general equilibrium models
assume homothetic preferences over consumption at di￿erent dates (which is to say power felicity
functions and a constant EIS). Standard Ramsey-type arguments then imply that intertemporal
trade-o￿s should not be distorted. Thus, the policy prescription relies on the EIS being constant.
More generally, the assumption of a constant EIS may have signi￿cant implications when evaluating
the costs of business cycles or evaluating a policy change in a dynamic general equilibrium model
with heterogeneous agents.
The goal of this paper is to highlight a surprisingly strong limitation that the assumption of a
constant EIS imposes on the nature of the allocation of expenditure across goods within a period.
In particular, the power form for preferences over total expenditure1 that delivers a constant EIS
requires that within period preferences must be from the PIGL/PIGLOG class. These preferences
correspond to rank 2 demand systems. The rank of a demand system is the rank of the matrix of
coe￿cients on income terms, or equivalently the dimension of the space spanned by Engel curves
1Under expected utility, the power form is over total expenditure in each period. Under non-expected utility, as
in Epstein and Zin (1989), the power form is over total expenditure in the current period and over the certainty
equivalent in the next period.
1(Lewbel, 1991). Essentially, to restrict the rank of a demand system is to place restrictions on the
shapes that Engel curves for di￿erent goods can exhibit. For example, homothetic preferences over
goods are rank 1, and imply that all Engel curves are linear, and that goods are neither necessities
nor luxuries. Increasing rank implies increasing ￿exibility. The rank 2 restriction on the shapes of
Engel curves required for a constant EIS is contradicted by a substantial body of empirical evidence
on demands.
We show further that if we assume a constant EIS, and we allow that agents consume both
luxuries and necessities (so that within period preferences are non-homothetic) then the parameter
of the power felicity function is pinned down completely by the shape of Engel curves and thus
the EIS can be estimated without any variation in the intertemporal price. The fact that a price
elasticity can be estimated without variation in the relevant price illustrates just how strong the
constant EIS assumption is.
There is a large empirical literature that attempts to estimate the EIS using data on consumption
growth. This turns out to be a di￿cult problem, because data on consumption growth is noisy,
because we have limited variation in the intertemporal price (the interest rate) and because the
relationship between the intertemporal price and consumption growth is mediated by uncertainty and
liquidity constraints. With very few exceptions, this literature also assumes that the EIS is constant.
The small number of papers that explore whether the EIS varies with the level of consumption
(or wealth) seem to reject the constant EIS hypothesis (Blundell, Browning and Meghir, 1994,
Atkeson and Ogaki, 1996, and Attanasio and Browning, 1995). However, these rejections tend not
to be statistically strong, exactly for the reasons just listed. By contrast, the connection between
intra- and inter-temporal allocation developed in this paper provides for a much more powerful
test of the constant EIS assumption (and one that, at least implicitly, has already been carried
out.) Our test is more powerful because we have large amounts of household level budget data and
variation in total expenditure, compared to the limited amount of data available with variation in the
intertemporal price. Our results support those of the papers that reject the constant EIS assumption
using consumption growth data. It is also consistent with the results in Guvenen (2006), who shows
2that introducing heterogeneity in the EIS improves the ￿t of a calibrated macro model. Our result
provides a theoretical explanation for these empirical ￿ndings: the EIS cannot be constant because
the within period budget allocations of rich and poor households di￿er in a complicated way.
In the next section we develop our main result in the familiar expected utility context. In this
context, the constant EIS assumption corresponds to Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA). In
Section 3 we consider two important extensions. First, we show that our result holds for the more
general recursive preferences proposed by Epstein and Zin (1989,1991). These preferences relax the
link between the EIS and risk aversion but maintain the constant EIS assumption. Second, returning
to an expected utility framework, we extend our analysis beyond the constant EIS assumption to
consider the more general class of HARA preferences where the EIS can vary in particular ways with
wealth. Section 4 provides an empirical illustration. Section 5 concludes.
2 Constant EIS with Expected Utility




where v(xt) is the \felicity" function that captures the utility derived from per period \consump-
tion", xt. Of course, households consume many goods. We interpret v(xt) as the indirect utility
function derived over total expenditure within the period and within period prices. This interpreta-
tion follows from two-stage budgeting which holds because intertemporal preferences are additive.
We should therefore write v (xt;pt), where pt is a vector of prices of di￿erent goods. This interpre-
tation has been adopted by a number of papers that simultaneously examine inter- and intra-period
allocation (Blundell, Browning, and Meghir, 1994, and Attanasio and Weber, 1995, among others).
An alternative interpretation would treat v (xt) as a direct utility function de￿ned over the composite
consumption good, xt: This relies either on (Hicks) composite commodity arguments (which require
constant relative prices) or on the assumption of within-period homotheticity. We do not consider
either to be credible. The assumption of constant relative prices is contrary to everyday experience
3and is particularly di￿cult to defend for an open economy (movements in gasoline prices are a good
counter example.) More formally, the fact that demand systems - including price responses - can be
estimated on aggregated data (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a, is a classic example) is itself evidence
of substantial variation in relative prices. The alternative assumption of within period homotheticity
implies that there are neither luxuries nor necessities, which, as Deaton (1992) notes \contradicts
both common sense and more than a hundred years of empirical research." Homotheticity over goods
is formally rejected not just by micro data but also in aggregate data (see, for example, Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980a).
Throughout our analysis, we follow Browning (1985/2005) and de￿ne the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution (EIS) as the derivative of log total expenditure with respect to the log of the
intertemporal price (that is, the interest rate) holding within-period relative prices and the dis-








The EIS is constant when it is independent of relative prices and of total expenditure. The reciprocal
of the EIS is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption. In the expected utility
context, this elasticity is the coe￿cient of relative risk aversion.
Remark 1 The EIS is constant (ie. independent of total within period expenditure and relative






+ b(p) ￿ 6= 1 (2)
v = a(p)log(x) + b(p) ￿ = 1 (3)
These are the canonical forms of, respectively, PIGL and PIGLOG preferences, Muellbauer (1975,
1976).2 Note PIGL preferences (2) are homothetic if @b=@p = 0 and PIGLOG preferences are
homothetic if @a=@p = 0.
2PIGL preferences are those that can be represented by the utility function in equation (2). Any monotonic
4This result can be found in Muellbauer (1987) and Browning (1985/2005). Su￿ciency follows
directly from repeated di￿erentiation of these utility functions with respect to total expenditure and
substitution into equation (1). Necessity follows by taking expression (1) and integrating twice, and
allowing the constants of integration to depend on prices. The point of this remark is to note that the
indirect utility functions resulting from the assumption of a constant EIS correspond to well known
demand systems. Neither Browning nor Muellbauer consider the potential value of this relationship
for testing the constant EIS assumption. Attanasio and Weber (1995) show that PIGLOG demands
are also consistent with an EIS that depends on prices, but not total expenditure.
Under the constant EIS assumption, the connection between inter-temporal and intra-temporal
allocation is even stronger than this, as we now show.






+ b(p) ￿ 6= 1;bp (p) 6= 0 (4)
or
v = a(p)logx + b(p) ￿ = 1;ap (p) 6= 0 (5)
then there is no transformation F (v (x;p)) = ! (x) such that (i) F (￿) is monotonic, single-argument





(ie. ￿!x=(!xxx) is constant) and (iii) ￿ 6= ￿:
transformation of this utility function would generate the same within period demands. PIGLOG preferences are
those that can be represented by equation (3).
PIGL/PIGLOG preferences are a subset of the Generalized Gorman Polar Form (Gorman, 1959): u(x) =
F [x=￿(p)] + ￿ (p) where F is a monotone, increasing function. PIGL/PIGLOG preferences have the convenient
property of allowing exact nonlinear aggregation (over agents). See Muellbauer (1975, 1976) or Deaton and Muell-
bauer (1980a, 1980b).
5Proof. Consider ￿rst the PIGL case (4). The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that such an F(￿)
does exist, we proceed in two steps:

















where ￿ is the power parameter (EIS) de￿ned by the function v: Properties (i) and (ii) imply
that k must be independent of prices and expenditure.
If F (￿) is linear, then Fvv = 0, thus k = 0: This means that ￿!xxx=!x is constant, but also
that ￿ = ￿, contradicting property (iii). Thus F(￿) must be nonlinear (Fvv 6= 0):
F (￿) must therefore satisfy:
Fvvvxx
Fv
= k ; k 6= 0: (6)
2. Given(4); we know vx = a(p)x￿ 1



























De￿ning ￿ and ￿ to be constants of integration, this di￿erential equation has the general
solution:












However, this F(￿) is a function of p: Fp 6= 0; which is a contradiction (of i).
The argument for the PIGLOG case (5) follows the same steps.
6Notice that linear transformations preserve the property we are interested in (that is, ￿!x=(!xxx)
is constant if F(￿) is linear) but in that case ￿ = ￿: Also notice the importance of b(p): By requiring
that bp (p) 6= 0; Proposition 1 is limited to the nonhomothetic case of PIGL and PIGLOG prefer-
ences. If bp (p) = 0 there are many transformations such ￿!x=(!xxx) = ￿ and ￿ 6= ￿: For example,
any power function will do.
Corollary 1 Assume:
1. Intertemporal utility is additive in felicity,
2. The felicity function is of the form given in equation (2) or (3) (so that the EIS is constant),
3. Within-period preferences are non-homothetic,
then the EIS is identi￿ed by the shape of the Engel curves.
Given that within period preferences are ordinal, the reader may wonder why monotonic (price
independent) transformations of within period preferences do not allow one to vary the curvature of
the felicity function for any given within period demands. This is what Proposition 1 rules out.
Another way to see this result is as follows. Let preferences over within period allocations
be represented by the function u(x;p); let F(u) be a single argument monotonically increasing
transformation and let the felicity function be v(x;p) = F (u(x;p)). De￿ning H ￿ F￿1; which is











u(x;p) = H (a(p)logx + b(p)) ￿ = 1

















￿ = 1;8j (9)
where aj and bj are the derivatives of a(p) and b(p) with respect to the price of good j, pj. The
parameter ￿ determines the EIS (equation 2) and the curvature of the Engel curve with respect to
7total within period expenditure (equation 8). If demand data identify a particular member of the
PIGL/PIGLOG class, they also identify the (constant) value of the EIS. One Engel curve is su￿cient
to identify the EIS.
Turning to a speci￿c example, suppose that u were a member of the PIGL family with curvature


















+ b(p) = F(u);















where the composite function M(z) = F(G(z)) is also an increasing monotonic transformation
(independent of prices). Proposition 1 states that there is no such nonlinear transformation M (z),
while a linear M(z) would imply ￿ = ￿:
This example also makes clear the role of non-homotheticity of within period preferences. Ho-






















has many solutions (M(z) can be any power function.). The fact that this result does not hold in
the homothetic case makes intuitive sense: under PIGL, with homothetic preferences, bj (p) = 0 8j;
budget shares are ￿at for all values of ￿; and hence not informative about the value of ￿.
To see the connection to the speci￿cation studied by Attanasio and Weber (1995), suppose
that within period preferences are PIGLOG (with canonical form ￿(p)logx + ￿(p)), G(z) is the














￿(p) ￿ ￿(p) + 1
and is independent of x but dependent on p: Note that here, the parameter ￿ (and therefore the
EIS) is not identi￿ed by within period demands. As Corollary 1 states, the EIS is identi￿ed from
demands if and only if the EIS is independent of both expenditure and relative prices. With this
speci￿cation, the EIS is independent both of expenditure and of relative prices if and only if within
period demand is homothetic, ie ￿j (p) = 0; 8j:
There is a substantial recent literature (Ludvigson and Paxson, 2001, Carroll, 2001, Attanasio
and Low, 2004, Browning and Alan, 2003) documenting the di￿culties associated with estimating the
EIS from data on consumption growth and the intertemporal price (Euler equation estimation). One
response to these problems has been to move to structural estimation, as in Gourinchas and Parker
(2002). Structural estimation brings its own di￿culties, including that fact that the environment in
which agents operate must be completely - and correctly - speci￿ed. However, all of the above papers
assume that intertemporal preferences have the additive-over-time, power form. Thus it seems that
this literature has been going to considerable e￿ort to estimate a model parameter, which, under
the maintained assumptions of the model, could be estimated much more simply and easily.
However, the crucial point is that PIGL/PIGLOG (and hence a constant EIS) implies testable
restrictions on the shapes of Engel curves. It has not been common, in the literature, to test
PIGL/PIGLOG preferences against more general alternatives.3 On the other hand, PIGL/PIGLOG
preferences are at most rank 2 (the homothetic form being rank 1) and the literature contains numer-
ous tests of demand system rank. For example, Lewbel (1991), Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997)
and Donald (1997) provide nonparametric tests of rank, and Lewbel (2003) describes a parametric
approach using a rational rank four demand system that nests rational rank three polynomial de-
mands. The typical ￿nding of this literature is that demands are at least rank 3, and possibly rank 4.
3More commonly, a particular member of this class - usually a parameterization of PIGLOG - is tested against
a non-PIGL/PIGLOG parametric demand system which nests only that particular member of the class. See for
example, Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997).
9In other words, there is a strong consensus that rank 2 demand systems (including PIGL/PIGLOG)
provide an inadequate representation of intra-period allocation, which implies that the EIS can not
be constant.
In terms of equations (8) and (9), a PIGL/PIGLOG speci￿cation of preferences can be tested in
two ways: ￿rst, one can test whether the curvature of individual Engel curves is adequately captured
by equations (8) and (9). That is, for each good, we can test equations (8) and (9) against more
general speci￿cations. Second, estimates of equations (8) and (9) for di￿erent goods should all give
the same value of ￿.
This approach to testing the constant EIS assumption has considerable advantages over tests
using consumption growth. Evidence from data on consumption growth is against a constant EIS
(Blundell, Browning and Meghir, 1994, Atkeson and Ogaki, 1996, and Attanasio and Browning,
1995). However, these tests face the same di￿culties as Euler equation estimation. They use limited
variation in the intertemporal price and noisy consumption growth data to assess not just how
consumption growth responds to the intertemporal price (as in the usual Euler equation estimation
exercise) but also how that relationship varies with the level of consumption. It is perhaps not
surprising then that the results of these tests are often suggestive but not strongly statistically
signi￿cant (as in Blundell, Browning and Meghir, 1994). In contrast, tests of the PIGL speci￿cation
based on the curvature of Engel curves are powerful simply because we have so much household
level budget data and so much variation in total expenditure. This approach to testing the constant
EIS assumption does require that the EIS be homogeneous (as does a test based on consumption
growth), however, because we have substantial household level budget data our test can be feasibly
implemented on more homogeneous subgroups.
103 Extensions
3.1 Non-Expected Utility
In the analysis above, we use an expected utility framework where the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is the reciprocal of the coe￿cient of relative risk aversion. Given the restrictiveness
of this assumption, a number of researchers have moved to using more general preferences, follow-
ing Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991). In this section, we show that the result tying the (constant)
intertemporal elasticity to within period demands holds for these more general preferences.
Consider an agent maximising utility at age t, given by
Ut = v￿1 (￿v(ct) + (1 ￿ ￿)v(zt+1))) (10)
where zt+1 is the certainty equivalent of random future utility:
zt+1 = g￿1(E[g (Ut+1)]); (11)
and ct is \consumption" in period t (de￿ned more carefully below) and v(ct) is the \felicity" function
that captures the utility derived from period t consumption. Assume that v0 > 0;v00 < 0: Even in
this non-expected utility set-up, there is still additivity between within period utility in period t and
the value of the certainty equivalent in t + 1:











Epstein and Zin (1991) specify that both the function governing intertemporal substitution and























They choose this speci￿cation to give a constant EIS equal to ￿:
11Epstein and Zin (1991, pp 272) are explicit that they have in mind a single consumption good.
However, individuals consume more than one good and in their empirical work, Epstein and Zin use
total nominal expenditure de￿ated by a single price index: using a single price index implies that
intratemporal preferences are homothetic.
We can allow for more general intratemporal preferences in the spirit of the Epstein-Zin approach
as follows. Let ut = u(xt;pt) be a representation of within period preferences. The associated cost
function c(ut;p0) and reference price vector p0 gives a monetary measure of within period utility
c(u(xt;pt);p0) for which we can calculate a certainty equivalent. This can be called \consumption".
Thus:
Ut = v￿1 (￿v(ct) + (1 ￿ ￿)v(zt+1))) (14)
zt+1 = g￿1(E[g (Ut+1)])
ct = c(u(xt;pt);p0) (15)
so that:
Ut = v￿1 (￿v(c(u(xt;pt);p0)) + (1 ￿ ￿)v(zt+1))) (16)
Proposition 2 The EIS (de￿ned, as above, as ￿@ logxt=@rt) is independent of prices and total




t + n(pt); ￿ 6= 1 (17)
v(c(u(xt;pt);p0)) = m(pt)logxt + n(pt); ￿ = 1 (18)
Proof. Just as in Remark 1, su￿ciency follows directly from repeated di￿erentiation of these utility
functions with respect to total expenditure and substitution into the de￿nition of the EIS. Necessity
follows by taking the de￿nition of the EIS (equation 1) and integrating twice, and allowing the
constants of integration to depend on prices.
12Corollary 2 For the EIS to be constant with this multi-good version of Epstein-Zin preferences,
within period preferences, u(xt;pt); must be PIGL/PIGLOG.
Note that v(￿) is monotonically increasing in c; and also, given the reference price p0, the cost
function, c(ut(xt;pt);p0), is monotonically increasing in u: Thus, v(c(u(xt;pt);p0)) is a monotonic
transform of within period preferences. Since v(￿) is canonical PIGL/PIGLOG, within period pref-
erences must therefore be in the PIGL/PIGLOG class.
The implication of this result is that demands can be used to test the constant EIS assumption
with this speci￿cation of recursive preferences. Thus the approach to testing the constant EIS
assumption proposed in this paper is more general that the expected utility framework.
Proposition 3 If
1. Preferences are given by (13)
2. v(c(u(xt;pt);p0)) takes the canonical PIGL/PIGLOG form (equation 17)so that the EIS is
constant.
3. Within period preferences (u(xt;pt)) are not homothetic.
then the EIS is identi￿ed by the shape of the Engel curves..
Proof. Since within period preferences are in the PIGL/PIGLOG class, a monotonic transformation,
H(￿); of within period preferences gives the canonical form. We focus on the PIGL case, but the
























13Substituting this expression for consumption into the recursive utility framework gives:
















t + n(pt) (19)
where ￿ is the parameter from within period demands and ￿ is the intertemporal parameter. It




t and ￿ = ￿:
As before, if within period preferences are homothetic and so bj (p) = 0 8j; the functional
equation has many solutions and there is no restriction on the value of the EIS implied by within
period demand.
3.2 Money Metric Measures of Consumption
From the analysis of the previous subsection, it may seem that if we de￿ne \consumption" as
the money metric measure of utility as in equation (15), and have power felicity de￿ned over this
measure of consumption, we can have a constant EIS of \consumption" (EIS = ￿@ logct=@rt),
for any underlying within period demands. This is not correct. The key point is that the budget
constraint is naturally de￿ned in terms of total (nominal) expenditure, xt:
Wt+1 = (1 + rt)(Wt ￿ xt)
If preferences are homothetic, then we can de￿ate nominal expenditure using a single price index
and ‘consumption’ is linear in total expenditure. This implies that the budget constraint is linear in
both total expenditure and consumption. By contrast with nonhomothetic preferences, in order to
de￿ate nominal expenditure, we need more than one price index and ‘consumption’ de￿ned as the
money metric utility measure, is nonlinear in total expenditure.




























Rearranging to give x as a function of c;



















We can then rewrite the budget constraint in terms of c:
f (ct+1;pt+1;p0) = (1 + r)(Wt ￿ f (ct;pt;p0))
The nonlinearity of (20) when bj (p) 6= 0 means that the budget constraint must be nonlinear in
consumption. This in turn means that even with power felicity function over consumption, the EIS
is not independent of the level of consumption.











lnct = ln￿ + ln(1 + r) + ln
@f (ct;pt;p0)
@ct
This implicitly de￿nes an EIS (@ lnct=@rt) which varies with ct unless @2f (ct;pt;p0)=@c2
t = 0; which
only holds when bj (p) = 0; 8j; ie when demands are homothetic.
3.3 HARA Preferences
A natural extension to the assumption of a constant EIS is to allow the EIS to vary in particular
ways with expenditure. For example, within the expected utility framework, the HARA class yields




= ￿ + ￿x￿1 (21)
15This class includes CRRA which yields a constant EIS. Other members of the HARA class are
quadratic, negative exponential, and translated power.4 Within the HARA class, both increasing
and decreasing relative risk (or ￿uctuation) aversion are possible. Many important results in ￿nance
rest on the assumption of HARA preferences, such as the two-fund separation theorems (See for
example Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesigner, 2005).5
Here we show the restrictions on within period utility implied by this more general speci￿cation
of preferences. In particular, analogously to Remark 1 and Proposition 1, we show that assuming
intertemporal preferences are additive with utility functions of the HARA class implies demand
functions which are of at most rank 3.
Solving equation (21) for vx








￿ + B (p)
















(￿ + ￿x)1￿ 1
￿
The translation ￿ is sometimes interpreted as subsistence consumption.
5Just as additivity plus the power functional form gives homothetic intertemporal preferences, additivity plus
HARA preferences gives quasi-homothetic preferences over time periods or states (Pollack, 1971). Inter-temporal
expansion paths (and Engel curves for periods or states) are linear but not through the origin. This linearity is crucial






￿ + B (p)
and the proof to proposition 1 given above can be applied directly (noting that vQ = vx because
@Q=@x = 1).
Thus, under the HARA functional form, the EIS is still identi￿ed by the curvature of Engel
curves (as long as within period preferences are not homothetic), and the assumption of HARA






































Note that these demands are most rank 3.6
In comparison to a speci￿cation with a constant EIS, this extra degree of rank means that there
may be more scope to rationalize HARA intertemporal preferences with within period demand
patterns. In practice, the two members of the HARA class which generate rank 3 demands are
translated power and quadratic. The latter imply certainty equivalent behaviour (no precautionary
saving motive). Thus, if we wish to assume HARA preferences, but rule out quadratic utility (because
of the substantial empirical evidence of precautionary behaviour), then evidence of demands being (at
least) rank 3 can only be accommodated by translated power utility. Translated power utility exhibits
an EIS that rises with wealth (the rich are less averse to proportional ￿uctuations in consumption
and more inclined to move consumption across time to take advantage of the rate of return). Ogaki
and Zhang (2001) show that the translated power utility function implies substantially di￿erent
6Lewbel and Perraudin (1995) show that there is a correspondence between the rank of demands and the degree
of fund separation: for example, two -fund separation is consistent with rank 2 demands. Note that this is a very
di￿erent result from ours: Lewbel and Perraudin are refering to the rank of (general) preferences over states and
treating total consumption in each state as a single commodity.
17behaviour from CRRA. Complete risk sharing is rejected using CRRA but not when preferences are
speci￿ed as translated power.7
Note also that the term in equation (22) that gives the extra degree of ￿exibility goes to zero as
total within period expenditure grows. As total expenditure grows, the rate of increase of the EIS
decreases: translated power utility converges to the constant EIS case, implying that the demands of
the rich should be very close to rank 2. One way out of this might be to assume that the translation
(￿) is determined by an external reference point as in models of \external habits" (Campbell and
Cochrane, 1999, or Lettau and Uhlig, 2000). Campbell and Cochrane show that such external habits
can reconcile consumption behaviour with stock market returns. Our results suggest that adding
external habits to our consumption models may also help reconcile them with demand data. Such an
extended model would imply that budget shares depend in testable ways on both total expenditure
and the excess of total expenditure over the reference point (see equation (22)). If, instead of external
habits, we were to introduce habits which were a function of past choices by the individual, as in
Constantinides (1990), this would break the intertemporal separability of consumers’ choices and
proposition 1 would not hold.
4 Empirical Illustration
As a brief illustration, we estimate Engel curves with micro data on expenditures from the 1997 and
1998 UK Family Expenditure Survey. To avoid (unobserved) within-period price variation, we focus
on households in London and the South East (as in Banks, Blundell and Lewbel, 1997). We also
focus on a restricted set of family types: couples with and without children.
As shown in equation (8), we can write the budget share equation for good j:
7In standard risksharing models, the consumption growth of an agent (household or group) is related to aggregate
consumption growth by that agent’s relative risk aversion. Thus, under full insurance with CRRA, the consumption
growth of each agent is equal to aggregate consumption growth and so the cross-section variance of consumption
is una￿ected by aggregate shocks. By contrast, full insurance with HARA preferences allows for changes in the










￿￿1 ￿ 6= 1 (23)
If the assumption of power utility is valid, the curvature from ￿ should capture all the curvature in
Engel curves and the estimate of the parameter ￿ should be the same for any Engel curve. Table 1
reports, for four di￿erent goods, the estimate of ￿ (the EIS), a con￿dence interval for that estimate,
the implied coe￿cient of relative risk aversion, and test of equation (8). A system of four equations
of the form of Equation (23) was estimated by nonlinear least squares. It is worth stressing that
although we imposed that ￿ must be constant across households, we did not restrict the degree of
independent heterogeneity entering via the slope or intercept coe￿cients. The speci￿c parametric
alternative that we tested against is the general HARA share equation developed in the previous
section.8
8We considered a number of other parametric alternatives. These all gave similar results.
19Table 1: Estimates and Tests of Constant EIS Engel Curves
Commodity ￿ Het. Robust Test of Functional Form
(EIS) Con￿dence Interval (Het. Consistent T-test)
Food 1.72 [1.31,2.14] -0.23
Clothing 1.43 [0.47,2.40] -1.31
Fuel and Light 2.69 [1.50,3.89] -1.91
Leisure Services 0.56 [0.47,0.65] -0.27
Test of Equality ￿2
3 = 43.74 (p<0.0001)
We begin, in the ￿rst row, with the Food Engel curve. The estimate of ￿ is 1.7, which is higher
than EIS estimates obtained from linearized Euler equation estimation: Attanasio and Weber (1995)
estimate the EIS to be 0.67. However, estimates of the EIS in the literature vary substantially because
of di￿culties with identi￿cation discussed earlier. For example, the EIS implied by the shape of the
food Engel curve is within the wide range of (implied) EIS estimates that Gourinchas and Parker
(2002) report (￿ = 0:7 to ￿ = 2:0), based on their structural estimation strategy.
The 2nd, 3rd and 4th rows of Table 1 report similar estimates and tests for clothing, for fuel and
light and for leisure services. For clothing we obtain an estimate of ￿ similar to that from the food
Engel curve. The estimate based on the fuel and light Engel curve is a bit higher. Both of these
estimates are less precise than the estimate based on the food Engel curve. For leisure services, we
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Figure 1: Restricted and Unrestricted Engel Curve Estimates
Turning to testing, we ￿rst consider the restriction on the shape of each individual Engel curve.
For none of the goods that we consider do we reject the functional form of equation (23) against a
more ￿exible alternative (at a conventional 5% level of statistical signi￿cance.)
However, even an informal examination of the four estimates of ￿ and their con￿dence intervals
reveals that the restriction that ￿ must be common across goods is strongly rejected by the data.
A formal test gives a ￿2
3 test statistic of 43.7 and a p-value of less than 0.0001. Thus the data is
incompatible with the constant EIS hypothesis. This illustrates that the power of this demand based
test of the constant EIS hypothesis derives from this restriction that ￿ be common across goods.
Our results are illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the ￿tted Engel curves when ￿ is unrestricted
and when it restricted to be common across goods. The optimal estimate of ￿ under this restriction
is 1.72. The restricted and unrestricted Engel curves are quite similar for food, clothing and fuel and
light. However, they di￿er markedly for leisure services. Thus in this example it is the behaviour of
the leisure services share which cannot be reconciled with the constant EIS hypothesis.
We emphasize again that this example is intended only as an illustration. The literature contains
21rejections of the hypothesis that demands are rank 2 based on parametric tests. However, these tests
typically proceed by adding terms to polynomials in log expenditure, rather than testing against an
alternative that corresponds to a particular class of utility function (eg translated power). The liter-
ature also contains rejections of rank 2 using nonparametric tests (Lewbel, 1991). However, having
demands that are rank 2 is necessary but not su￿cient for having demands that are PIGL/PIGLOG.
Thus a nonparametric test of rank is not strictly a direct test of the constant EIS assumption but
rather a test for a necessary condition. Having said this, the clear message from the literature is that
demands cannot be adequately represented by rank 2. Finally, since PIGL preferences are necessary
and su￿cient for a constant EIS in a general recursive utility framework, these rejections of rank 2
are also rejections of the constant EIS assumption in our multi-good version of Epstein-Zin (1991).
5 Discussion
This paper has shown that assumptions about the form of inter-temporal preferences impose restric-
tions on within period allocations. Within period demands must be in the PIGL/PIGLOG class if
they are to be consistent with a constant EIS, whether the constant EIS speci￿cation is in an ex-
pected utility CRRA framework or in an Epstein-Zin framework. This means that the assumption
of a constant EIS requires that within period demands be at most rank 2, a restriction which is
typically rejected by demand data. Moreover, if within period preferences are not homothetic (as is
surely the case), and the EIS is constant, and intertemporal preferences are either expected utility or
Epstein-Zin, then the EIS can be estimated from a single Engel curve (without data on consumption
growth or variation the inter-temporal price). This illustrates just how restrictive the constant EIS
assumption is. Finally, the connection between intra- and intertemporal allocation is not limited
to the constant EIS case. For example, the broader class of HARA (intertemporal) preferences are
consistent with a particular form of intratemporal demands which are at most rank 3.
More generally our results re￿ect the fact that all behavioral responses are governed by the cur-
vature of the (indirect) utility function. Thus they are similar in spirit to Deaton (1974) who showed
22that additivity over goods implied a connection between (intratemporal) price and income elastici-
ties, and to Deaton (1992) and Browning and Crossley (2000) who note that additivity over time and
goods implies that the intertemporal substitution elasticities of particular goods are proportional to
their income elasticities.
Our analysis shows that the assumption of a constant EIS form for the felicity function is incon-
sistent with well documented features of the micro-data on intra-temporal allocation. Our analysis
supports the results of Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994) and Attanasio and Browning (1995)
who ￿nd evidence that the EIS is not constant. Our paper provides a further explanation for those
results: the EIS cannot be constant because the within period allocations of rich and poor households
di￿er in a complicated way.
An obvious question is how wrong is the constant EIS assumption. In a statistical sense, our
empirical results amount to a large rejection of the over-identifying restrictions implied by this
functional form. It is more di￿cult to give an economic answer. The di￿culty arises because
with a general speci￿cation of the felicity function, we must use data on consumption growth and
variation in the intertemporal price to characterize the EIS (and how the EIS varies with the level of
consumption). As discussed above, this is a di￿cult task. We do know that relaxing the constant EIS
assumption can signi￿cantly change our answers to substantive questions. For example, Ogaki and
Zhang (2001) show that it is important to allow for declining relative risk aversion (increasing EIS)
when testing the full risk-sharing hypothesis. Guvenen (2006) shows that allowing for heterogeneity
in the EIS can improve the ￿t of a calibrated macro-model
The importance of our result is in refuting the belief that properties of intertemporal allocations
can be independent of the properties of within period allocation. This belief underpins the use of the
constant EIS assumption in much modern macroeconomics. We show that this assumption requires
that within period allocations take particular forms which are rejected by the evidence.
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